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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1431 
_____________ 
 
MOHAMMAD ISRAIL,  
Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                     Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-646-866) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Philip Verrillo 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________________
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
Mohammad Israil seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s decision 
affirming the Immigration Judge’s dismissal of Israil’s claims for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that 
follow, we will dismiss Israil’s petition for asylum, but grant Israil’s petition for review 
on his withholding of removal and CAT claims.  
I.1 
Israil is a 58-year-old citizen of Pakistan who entered the United States on 
February 17, 2006. Before the Immigration Judge, Israil testified that he is a member of 
the Awami National Party (“ANP”), a leftist political party that openly opposes the 
Taliban. In 2003, Israil became the General Secretary for the ANP in Kabal. In December 
2005, Taliban members came to Israil’s home when he was not there and instructed 
Israil’s brother to tell Israil that he should leave the ANP and remove his children from 
school or the Taliban would not “leave [him] alive.”2 Israil reported the threats to the 
local police but did not receive any assistance. Shortly thereafter, Israil received a letter 
from the Taliban stating he would be killed if he did not leave the ANP. In response, he 
fled with his family to Peshawar. There, they relocated several times over a three month 
period out of fear of being found by the Taliban.  
Israil then came to the United States in 2006.  His family has remained in 
                                              
1 Because we write for the parties who are familiar with the factual and procedural 
history of this case, we provide only the background necessary to our conclusions. 
2 A.R. 142. 
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Pakistan, but Israil testified that they continue to move frequently based on a belief that 
the Taliban would retaliate against them for Israil’s flight.  Israil testified that between 
2005 and 2014 his wife and children lived in Swat, Peshawar, Karachi, Nagar, Mardan, 
Deri, and Kabul, sometimes moving several times within the same city or region. His 
children have been unable to attend school in part because of fear that the Taliban would 
kidnap them in order to coerce them into disclosing Israil’s whereabouts. Their fear of the 
Taliban targeting Israil was corroborated on or about June 30, 2009, when Israil’s name 
was broadcast on a Taliban-run radio station and he was identified as someone the 
Taliban wanted to find. Israil also testified that the Taliban came to his home in Tal in 
2011 and 2012 and threatened his wife during the brief periods when she returned to 
check on their home. 
On August 20, 2008, Israil filed an application for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and withholding under CAT.  His filing was beyond the one year time bar for 
asylum applications, but Israil claimed that the application should still be considered 
based on changed circumstances in Pakistan. The IJ denied Israil all relief. Specifically, 
the IJ found that Israil failed to show changed circumstances in Pakistan sufficient to 
excuse his untimely petition. The IJ also found that Israil had not established the past 
persecution and possible future persecution necessary for withholding of removal, and 
that he had not established the likelihood of torture that would qualify for protection 
under the CAT if he returned to Pakistan. The BIA subsequently affirmed and this 
petition for review followed.  
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II.3 
 We first address Israil’s application for asylum and his claim that changed 
circumstances in Pakistan should excuse the untimeliness of his petition.4 Israil argues 
that his untimely application should be excused under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) because 
conditions in Pakistan have changed since he arrived in the United States. However, 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) limits our jurisdiction to reviewing constitutional claims and 
questions of law.5  We do not have authority to review the BIA’s discretionary findings 
of fact in determining whether country conditions had sufficiently changed to justify a 
late filing.6 Here, the BIA found that conditions in Pakistan had not changed such that 
Israil’s petition’s untimeliness could be excused. Israil challenges only the factual 
underpinnings of the IJ and BIA’s determination, arguing that conditions have changed.7  
However, he does not assert any legal or constitutional challenges to the BIA’s 
                                              
3 We have jurisdiction to review the IJ and BIA’s findings regarding Israil’s application 
for withholding of removal and protection under CAT. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review 
using the substantial evidence standard. Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d. 
Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we will not disturb the BIA’s findings if “a reasonable fact 
finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 
F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). However, as is 
discussed fully below, we lack jurisdiction to review the conclusion that Israil’s untimely 
filing of his asylum application is not excused due to changed country conditions. 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows consideration of an untimely petition if “the alien 
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General . . . the existence of changed 
circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” 
5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D). See also Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 
627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006). 
6 Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 633. 
7 Pet’r’s Br. 21–25.   
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determination. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Israil’s 
asylum petition.    
 Israil next argues that the IJ and BIA improperly denied his application for 
withholding of removal. To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must 
establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of experiencing persecution in the 
future upon removal to their home country, and the persecution must be “on account of,” 
among other things, “membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”8 A 
withholding of removal claim may be properly denied if the evidence demonstrates that 
future persecution could be avoided if the alien relocated to a different part of his home 
country.9  
We have held that a lack of physical harm, and threats that were not highly 
imminent in nature did not constitute past persecution.10 Here, Israil left the country 
following threats he received from Taliban members through his brother and a letter in 
the mail. Because Israil was never directly threatened or given a deadline to comply, the 
threats he received were not sufficiently imminent to constitute past persecution.11 We 
                                              
8 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). 
9 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). 
10 See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 341 (“[W]e have limited the types of 
threats constituting persecution to only a small category of cases, and only when the 
threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.”) 
11 See Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 336, 341–42 (holding that incidents where the 
petitioner was “rounded up” at gunpoint without physical injury or robbery were “oblique 
and not imminent” and did not constitute persecution); Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 
164 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that in determining whether a petitioner experienced past 
persecution “threats standing alone constitute persecution in only a small category of 
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therefore conclude that the record supports the BIA’s determination that those threats did 
not rise to the level of past persecution.  
Accordingly, Israil is only eligible for withholding of removal if he can 
demonstrate the threat of future persecution by “establish[ing] that it is more likely than 
not that he . . . would be persecuted on account of . . . [his] political opinion upon 
removal to that country.”12 There is no question that the Taliban is opposed to the 
ideology and mission of Israil’s political party, the ANP, and have assassinated hundreds 
of the parties’ members, including Israil’s wife’s cousin. Additionally, “[U]nfulfilled 
threats [that] fall within that category of past experience [are] more properly viewed as 
indicative of the danger of future persecution.”13 Before he left Pakistan, Israil received 
two threats from the Taliban demanding he leave the ANP or be killed. A full three years 
after Israil left Pakistan, the Taliban broadcast that they were still looking for him. 
Moreover, the Taliban visited his home in Tal in 2011 and 2012 to relay threats to his 
wife.   
Nevertheless, the government asserts that Israil may safely relocate to a different 
part of Pakistan and thus he is unable to make out a claim of a reasonable fear of future 
persecution.14 The IJ reasoned that relocation was reasonable because the Pakistani 
government is making efforts to target the Taliban. However, government attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                  
cases” and that “unfulfilled threats must be of a highly imminent and menacing nature in 
order to constitute persecution”). 
12 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). 
13 Boykov v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997). 
14 Respondent’s Br. 21–24.  
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control terrorist activity do not equate with actual success in controlling terrorist 
activity,15 and the record contains more than enough to establish the Pakistani 
government’s inability to control Taliban forces.  
The government also points to the fact that Israil’s family has remained in the 
country unharmed as evidence that Israil may safely return, but this conclusion glosses 
over the reason behind the frequent movement of Israil’s family and the nature of the 
family’s continuing flight. Israil’s wife and children have lived in at least seven different 
regions of Pakistan, for periods ranging from three months to approximately two years, 
fleeing each area when they had reason to believe that they were no longer safe from the 
Taliban and that the Taliban would retaliate against them for Israil leaving the country. 
The mere fact that his wife and children have not been physically harmed during this time 
does not suggest that Israil may safely rejoin his family in Pakistan.  Rather, it shows that 
the Taliban has thus far focused its vengeance only on Israil and not his family. 
Additionally, the multitude of different regions of Pakistan where Israil’s wife and 
children have fled only to have to flee again strongly supports Israil’s fear that he cannot 
safely return to a different region of Pakistan other than his hometown of Tal.16 
                                              
15 Rehman v. Att’y Gen., 178 F. App’x 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that though the 
Pakistani government was attempting to address the terrorist situation, it was “maybe not 
[doing so] successfully”). 
16 The First Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion while considering the 
reasonableness of an ANP member relocating within Pakistan. Khattak v. Holder, 704 
F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2013) (granting asylum petition for Pakistani member of the ANP and 
finding that the IJ had failed to consider evidence that ANP members were “major targets 
of attack” and the Taliban’s reach extended outside the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province). 
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Finally, when assessing the reasonableness of relocation, the adjudicator “should 
consider . . . ongoing civil strife within a country.”17 The government concedes that “the 
family moves to avoid generalized conditions of violence and civil strife.”18 The evidence 
supports Israil’s fear of future persecution, as well as the unreasonableness of forcing 
Israil to relocate to a different area of Pakistan.19 Accordingly, we hold that Israil 
succeeded in proving the likelihood of future persecution. 
 Last, Israil challenges the denial of relief under the CAT. For relief under the 
CAT, Israil must establish that “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if 
removed to the proposed country of removal.”20 “Torture” under CAT “is an extreme 
form of cruel and inhuman treatment” that is inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a 
public official.21 The “acquiescence” component can sometimes be established where the 
government is willfully blind to torture by nongovernment actors.22 Although there is 
evidence in the record that the government of Pakistan has made some efforts to curb the 
Taliban’s terrorist activities, this evidence does not foreclose the need to examine the 
                                              
17 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(3). 
18 Respondent’s Br. 23. 
19 The government argues that Israil’s future persecution claim is weakened by his family 
members remaining in Pakistan “unharmed.” Respondent’s Br. 18, 22. However, this 
Court has held that a claim of future persecution is only weakened if the petitioner’s 
family “remain safely” in the country and “there is no individualized showing that 
petitioner would be singled out for persecution.” Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  
20 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 
21 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1), (2). 
22 See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017); Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y 
Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2011); Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
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record to determine whether there is governmental acquiescence to allow for relief under 
CAT.23 Because Israil’s CAT claim stems from the same underlying facts as his 
withholding of removal claim, we also vacate the BIA’s dismissal of his CAT claim for 
the reasons discussed above.  
III.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant Israil’s petition for review in part. 
We dismiss Israil’s petition as to his asylum claim but grant it as to his withholding of 
removal and CAT claims. We remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
23 See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (“Circumstantial evidence may establish acquiescence to 
targeted acts of violence even when the government has an official policy or is engaged 
in a campaign of opposition against the entity the applicant fears.”); Pieschacon-Villegas, 
671 F.3d at 311 (“[A] government’s ability to control groups engaged in torturous 
activities may be relevant to, but not dispositive of, an assessment of willful blindness.”). 
Case: 16-1431     Document: 003112645773     Page: 9      Date Filed: 06/08/2017
